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How the Numbers Matter: Demographics and the 
Future of Hindu-Christian Dialogue 
Francis X. Clooney, S.J. 
Boston College 
Religious Demography of India. A. P. Joshi, 
M. D. Srinivas, and J. K. Bajaj. Chennai: 
Centre for Policy Studies, 2003. xxii + 358 
pp. 
IN Religious Demography of India, Bajaj, 
Joshi, and Srinivas analyze Indian census 
data from 1871 to 1991, in order to assess 
the shifts in demography in religious identity 
in India and on that basis make predictions 
about the future. They look closely into the 
data regarding the various states of India, 
and even the individual districts of those 
states. The book, coming in two parts, 
invites readers to study the data for 
themselves: the first 175 pages offer an 
analysis of census data, but pp. 179-346 are 
comprised entirely of tables reporting data, 
thus enabling readers to make up their own 
minds. 
Throughout, "India" refers to Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and India itself, here known as 
"the Indian lmion." The book proposes a 
kind of homogeneous native tradition 
comprised of "native religionists;" this 
group includes all the various Hindu 
traditions but also some other traditions too. 
As critics have noted (see below), the book 
is both overly generous and at the same time 
stingy: "Indian religionists" include Hindus, 
Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and also, strikingly, 
Parsis and Jews, but none of 
the Christian commumtIeS long and 
peacefully established in India, such as the 
Syriac Christians of Kerala, or the old 
Catholic communities of Tamil Nadu. 
Indeed, the Indian religionists are contrasted 
with the two aggressive religions from the 
West, Islam and Christianity. 
In the first part of this essay I comment 
directly on the book and reactions to it; in 
the second, I survey a few of the reactions to 
it in India; in the third, I sketch the 
possibilities of a wider, more integral study 
of the religious significance of demographic 
changes; in the fourth, I suggest how 
attention to it can affect Hindu-Christian 
studies. First, though, an admission: two of 
the authors' of Religious Demography of 
India, M. D. Srinivas and J. K. Bajaj, are 
friends of mine whom I am always happy to 
visit when in Chennai. I begin with respect 
for their integrity and seriousness about their 
work. I have also admired the contemporary 
analyses written and published by their 
Centre for Policy Studies in Chennai: 
Dharampal's Bharatiya Chitta Manas and 
Kala (tr. by J. K. Bajaj; see the discussion of 
this book in the Hindu-Christian Studies 
Bulletin in 1995), their monograph on food, 
food production, and hospitality, Annam 
Bahu Kurvita, and a timely edited volume, 
Ayodhya and the Future of India (1993, 
edited by J. K. Bajaj). In my mind, these 
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books demonstrate the authors' concern for 
India's religious identity, studied in the 
bright and harsh light of contemporary 
issues. I therefore approached this new book 
with a favorable attitude and willingness to 
take their research seriously, and in fact 
found Religious Demography a fascinating 
if not entirely adequate basis for a fresh 
assessment of "interreligious dialogue on the 
ground" in South Asia today. Yet I also 
write from Boston, and concede that 
regarding this book, like other publications 
from India, I may be missing some of the 
contextual factors that mark Indian readings 
of the book. 
1. 
At the book's start, the authors soberly 
assess the situation, stating their 
presupposition and conclusion: 
India, on the whole, has resisted 
Christianization; proportion of 
Christians in India remains around 2 
percent. And, India has not 
succumbed to the . expansion of 
Islam like some countries of 
Africa." (p. xxii). But Indian 
experience of the twentieth century 
has not been nearly as robust as that 
of China, where "not only the 
proportion but also the absolute 
number of Muslims ... has declined; 
and Christianity has failed to fmd 
any foothold. (p. xxii) 
At the book's end, the authors' 
perspective is broadened toward a global 
overview: 
Thus, seen in the perspective of the 
changing religious demography .of 
the world during the. twentieth 
century, [the] Indian situation does 
not seem too alarming. Christianity 
and Islam have both made 
substantial gains in the world. But it 
is Africa and some relatively 
smaller countries in Asia that have 
experienced the impact of growth of 
these religions the most. Africa has 
lost its Native Religionist moorings 
during the twentieth century. And in 
Asia, countries like Indonesia and 
South Korea have seen their 
religious complexion change fairly 
thoroughly. On the other hand, an 
ancient civilization like that of 
China has countenanced no change 
in its religious profile, nor have the 
relatively more recent civilizational 
religions of the world like West 
Asia, North Africa and Europe 
swayed from their adopted faiths. 
(pp. 174-175) 
Partition and other factors have led to an 
erosion of the Indian religions, yet there is 
hope for the future: "[M]uch of the country 
has remained largely immune to the advance 
of Christianity or Islam. Indian Religionists 
have maintained a dominant presence in 
almost all 'the northwestern, western, central 
and southern parts of the Indian Union ... In 
th1s vast region, Indian Religionists have 
shown great vitality; any tendency towards 
significant erosion of their share in any 
pocket of this region has often been swiftly 
neutralized." (p. 17 5) Yet concern is still 
warranted: "Such vitality, however, has not 
helped [Indian religionists] in, defending 
their presence on the borders of the country 
where the efforts of the society, to be 
effective, necessarily need the vigilance and 
support of a state committed to protecting 
and preserving the civilizational identity, 
pride and genius of the nation. We have so 
far failed to fashion such a state for 
ourselves." (p. 175) 
The tone of nervousness about the 
proximity of one's others is reflected in the 
names of the chapters: "states where Indian 
religionists dominate," "states where Indian 
religionist$ are under pressure," and "states 
where Indian religionists are turning a 
minority." It is as if Samuel Huntington's 
hypertense Clash of Civilizations was on the 
I 
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bookshelf right next to the volumes of 
census data. 
Describing interreligious prospects on 
the basis of census data inevitably leads to 
oversimplification, since the relationship 
among religions is read in tenns of ever 
more glaring numbers, while various less 
easily quantified phenomena are left out of 
consideration. Caste is left out, for instance, 
as are other social, political and cultural 
factors that might affect how religious 
people change their identities or fashion 
identities that cut across religious divides. 
Change occurs and is counted; religions are 
aggre~sive or· moderate or resistant; but the 
human persons who make choices shaping 
these changes are never mentioned. Beyond 
parents deciding how large a family to 
produce, presumably communities are 
comprised of agents able to decide how 
communities should respond and act in the 
fact of similar decisions made by people in 
other traditions. The identity of the agents of 
religious change and their motives as well 
require deeper investigation, even if we can 
also say that there is no one entirely in 
charge of the religious changes occurring 
today. There are religious changes, and 
attention must be given to the agents of that 
change - missionaries and Dalits, the ultra-
orthodox and the Mumbai elite, the 
politicians and the religious refonners -
who surely have their own plans and their 
own ways of reading the data. Even the 
word "conversion" appears not to occur in 
the book (which has no subject index), even 
though this key phenomenon - seeking to 
convert others, choosing to convert - must 
be closely connected to the trends that 
presumably disturb the authors. 
The analytic chapter concluding Part 
One of the book borrows data from the 
World Christian Encyclopedia to put those 
findings into the context of the wider global 
pattern of religious demographic changes. 
Here the authors again simplify the 
demographic portrait by including among 
the majority group in each part of the world 
the "non-religionists" and "atheists" listed in 
the areas. As a result, the areas of the world 
are simplified into religious blocks 
belonging to one religion or another, and the 
scenario is set for imagining a stark and too 
clear division between civilizations 
(perhaps) in (inevitable) clash, or at least 
competition, with one another. Again, 
Huntington seems to be in the 
neighborhood. 
II. 
Religious Demography received a great deal 
of attention in India after its release, in part 
because it addresses very sensitive issues 
related to India's religious identity and the 
future of Hinduism. It was also introduced at 
a high profile conference in Delhi in 
October 2003, where L. K.Advani, Deputy 
Prime Minister, released the book. Mr. 
Advani also wrote a laudatory foreword, in 
which he praises it as a guide to the 
"infonned judgments" Indian will have to 
make about "the strategic pressures India is 
likely to face. within its neighborhood in the 
near future." (p. xv) Some reviews praise the 
book's conscientious use of detail, its 
eschewal of heated rhetoric, and its sober 
assessment of a crucial topic. It is valued by 
many as a work that will remain an essential 
reference for decades to come. 
But Religious Demography has also 
been severely criticized. The authors are 
charged with drawing selectively on the 
voluminous census data, consulting only the 
religious data and thus oversimplifying the 
issues. They are also accused of a clumsy 
and amateur use of statistics, though rarely 
do the critics explain how statisticians 
should interpret the data. The book is 
accused of idealizing an ancient and 
homogenous Indian past, in part by its odd 
and problematic categories. Indeed, it is odd 
that all Jews and all Parsis counted as 
"Indian religionists" while all Christians and 
all Muslims are denied this status, portrayed 
instead as members of aggressive and alien 
religious communities. 
T 
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Some cntlclsms cut deeply. In The 
Telegraph (Calcutta, July 10, 2003), Partha 
Chatterjee calls the volume "shockingly 
clUde" in its underlying "social science 
theory." Without much ado she dismisses 
the notion of an ancient "homogenous 
religious civilization" and in a shorthand 
theology asserts that the postulation of a 
timeless sanatana dharma "makes nonsense 
of all accumulated textual, historical and 
anthropological scholarship on Indian 
religions." So too, she terms clUde the 
division of the world into Islamic, Christian, 
and native religions: "[the authors'] 
understanding of religion and religious 
communities is so blissfully ignorant of all 
social science that one can only attribute it 
to the intellectual innocence of former 
physical scientists." In The Week (July 27 
2003) B. G. Verghese links Religious 
Demography to the divisive views of 
Savarkar, Hedgewar, and Golwalkar, and 
reads it as favoring a cultural nationalism 
that in fact has "little reverence for tme faith 
and tradition," however these might be 
defined. The authors, he says, see India's 
pluralism· and diversity as "a cancer that 
must be contained if not eradicated." He 
suggests that its claims rely on a "bogus 
sociology" which oversimplifies the "Indian 
religions" and conceals the underlying 
tensions within Hinduism, b~etween Hindus 
and Buddhists and Jains, and along caste 
lines. The book's call for a national culture 
is tantamount to an appeal for "cultural 
sameness" bludgeoned into existence by 
"sundry cavemen." In People's Democracy 
(September 28, 2003), Nalini Taneja rails 
against this "fraudulent study" as a 
"demonizing demography" pretending to be 
social science, while in fact being nothing 
but a govemment subsidized justification for 
"ethnic cleansing." The book, in Teneja's 
view, avoids engaging the problem of 
defining Hinduism and conjures up a pure, 
simple Hindu past - and doing all this for 
the sake of encouraging (as the dust jacket 
puts it) "the task of nation building," "with 
an abiding passion." The book is backward 
looking, out of touch, and dangerous; 
perhaps, but Taneja is no more forthcoming 
with proof of her charges or indications of a 
better way to read the statistics. 
These wamings are at least a bit 
overheated, and they are perhaps aimed 
really at the' Hindu right wing the book is 
taken to symbolize. The effect, though, is 
that such reviewers seem to absolve 
themselves of addressing the specific issues 
raised by the book. While, Religious 
Demography might be used by paranoid and 
vicious elements in Indian society, it need 
not be inextricably bound to the far right. 
More trenchant and developed criticisms are 
to be found at the South Asian Citizen Web, 
www.sacw.net/2002/daval040n003.html. 
where John Dayal, in an essay subtly 
entitled, "Lies, Half TlUths and Statistics," 
offers a lengthy critique of the book, 
disputing almost every interpretation. His 
analysis, too detailed to rehearse here, 
emphasizes mainly that the book is alarmist, 
prone to read data in an unnecessarily dour 
fashion, seeing decline and threats where 
there are none. I am not convinced that 
Dayal has succeeded in demolishing the 
authors' main points, but his critique is a 
valuable companion to the book. 
Whatever their skills in statistical 
analysIs, I see no evidence that the authors 
are trying to obfuscate matters or promote 
hysteria without discussion. Even the book's 
oddities - Jews and Parsis as Indian 
religionists, little nuance regarding Hindu 
traditions or caste, etc. - are so manifestly 
evident and at the forefront, unconcealed, 
that it is hard to charge' the authors with 
doing anything other than what they claim to 
be doing: putting the statistics before the 
reader because, in their view, the data raise 
concems about the future. Perhaps others 
can interpret the data better, and it will be 
for the better were they to undertake an 
exhaustive study of the census data and offer 
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In fact, religious identities are changing 
constantly, and our authors are simply 
joining other observers of the hastening pace 
of religious demographic shifts. In his The 
Next Christendom: The Coming of Global 
Christianity (Oxford University Press, 
2002), Philip Jenkins reminds us of a global 
shift in the nature of Christianity. He too is 
cautious but insistent about the importance 
of demographics: "Projecting demographic 
changes as far ahead as fifty years in the 
future seems like a risky venture... Yet the 
process of Christian expansion outside 
Europe and the West does seem inevitable, 
and the picture offered here is based solidly 
on current trends, religious and 
demographic. In this instance, the 
foolishness seems justified." (p. 79) And 
Jenkins too sees a dramatic demographic 
shift under way: 
One central fact in the changing 
religious picture is a massive 
relative decline in the proportion of 
the world's people who live in the 
traditionally advanced nations. If we 
combine the figures for Europe, 
North America, and the lands of the 
former Soviet Union, then in 1900, 
these Northern regions accounted 
for 32 percent of the world 
population. Viewed over the span of 
world history, that may have been 
an untypically large proportion, 
which ,reflected the explosive 
demographic growth of the 
industrial revolution years. Over the 
course of the twentieth century, 
matters reverted to what was likely a 
more typical preindustrial norm, as 
the proportion of peoples living in 
the advanced nations fell, slowly at 
first, but then more dramatically. By 
1950, the share had fallen a little to 
29 percent, but the rate of 
contraction then accelerated, to 25 
percent in 1970, and around 18 
percent by 2000. By 2050, the figure 
should be around 10 or 12 percent. 
Relative growth rates in the South 
have been just as impressive. Africa 
and Latin America combined made 
up only 13 percent of the world's 
people in 1900, but that figure has 
now grown to 21 percent. Every 
indication suggests that the rate of 
change is accelerating. By 2050, 
Africa and Latin America will 
probably be home to 29 percent of 
the world's people. In. 1900, 
"Northerners" outnumbered these 
"Southerners" by about 2.5 to one; 
by 2050, the proportions will be 
almost exactly reversed. Overall, 
global population stands at 6 billion 
today, and should reach 9 billion 
around 2050, but that increase will 
not be equitably distributed around 
the globe. Southern nations are 
growing very rapidly, while their 
Northern neighbors are relatively 
static." (pp. 79-80) 
Jenkins also takes a step that the authors 
of Religious Demography do not; he 
reminds us that the shift is not just a matter 
of an unchanging Christianity experiencing 
movement, but of the arising of a newly 
configured dominant Christianity: 
The types of Christianity that have 
thrived most successfully in the 
global South have been very 
different from what many 
Europeans and North Americans 
consider mainstream. These models 
have been far more enthusiastic, 
much more centrally concerned with 
th,e immediate workings of the 
supernatural, through prophecy, 
VISIOns, ecstatic utterances, and 
healing ... Nor is this question of 
authenticity just a matter of 
academic interest. If in fact the bulk 
of the Christian population is going 
to be living in Africa, Asia, or Latin 
America, then practices that now 
prevail in those areas will become 
5
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ever more common across the globe. 
This is especially likely when those 
distinctive religious patterns are 
transplanted northward, either by 
migration, or by actual missions to 
the old imperial powers, to what 
were once the core nations of world 
Christianity." (pp. 107-108) 
If we see that similar shifts are occurring in 
other religions too - think of the current 
self-scrutiny occurring among Muslims 
globally (see for instance, Lawrence Rosen, 
The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of 
Contemporary Muslim Life, University of 
Chicago, 2002), or the changing face of 
Buddhism (see for instance, James Coleman, 
The New Buddhism: The Western 
Transformation of an Ancient Tradition, 
Oxford University Press, 2001) - then the 
"we" of global religiosity too is changing 
more dramatically, and not just in numbers. 
Tracking the numbers, without exploring 
more qualitative issues, is only a small part 
of a larger and even more interesting story. 
In other words, shifting demographics 
indicate also a shift in how religious 
identities will be understood and felt in the 
next centuries. Religious Demography 
would have been a stronger book has its 
authors explored the context of their 
numbers, and been more venturesome in 
their descriptions of the possible substantive 
changes in Hinduism as the religion wanes 
in some area,s and grows in others. Cannot 
we not imagine a global Hinduism that is 
changing in broader ways that are 
irreducible to the valid but limited task of 
counting Hindus in the districts and states of 
India? 
IV. 
To this reviewer, neither a statistician nor a 
social scientist, Religious Demography 
succeeds in bringing to the forefront a topic 
that requires discussion. It raises urgent 
questions, hard to ignore, as to the domain 
and climate in which dialogue occurs. We 
would be mistaken to avoid its questions 
simply on the grounds that the same 
statistics bear further and more nuanced 
readings; the authors have done the service 
of making it possible to argue about the 
meaning of the changing numbers. It is 
evident that India is changing, and it is not a 
sure thing that Hindu traditions will remain 
in the majority in the centuries to come. 
Were I a Hindu, I would be thinking hard 
about Hindu identity and its future in a 
world where Christians and Muslims both 
have devoted much energy to the conversion 
of members of other religions. 
Indeed, Religious Demography seems to 
tap successfully into real concerns Indian 
Hindus have about the future of their 
religion and culture and nation; even the 
harsh criticisms of the book suggest that 
sore points have been touched. It does so 
with a sober array of statistics which, 
however interpreted, reminds us that change 
IS occurrmg and change matters. It 
3;ccentuates, if not aggravates, a more 
urgent situation in which a more urgent 
confessional accounting is required. That the 
book has this value and deserves our 
attention does not do away with the 
legitimate concerns underlying it; but it does 
force us to reflect on how demographics 
mark necessarily deeper theological 
concerns about which the authors might say 
more. 
The book is so informative that it can 
confuse by its numbers and push timid 
readers back into generalities in favor of or 
against the book. But the matters have to 
become more complex; to. understand what 
is occurring today requires a shift to a level 
of more· complex social and religious· 
analysis wherein issues like caste cannot be 
left out or finessed by broad categorizations 
that downplay divisions and highlight 
commonalities; it requires a religious angle, 
as religious intellectuals are required to 
respond to a real life situation where the 
demographics give way to some deeper 
consideration of how complex religious 
identities resist counting, and elude the 
simplifications of demographics. Dividing 
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the world in religious blocks aids us in 
formulating a simple picture, but much of 
human experience has to do with blurring 
such boundaries, as people in countries like 
India or the United States become 
increasingly disposed to borrow from other 
traditions. What it means to be Hindu or 
Muslim or Christian is not decided by 
historians or sociologists, but by intelligent 
insiders to traditions who present their ideas 
in ways that are at least open to conversation 
with outsiders willing to listen and speak. 
Statistics on religion require a 
theological response if they are to be 
tmderstood properly; it is not for a 
statistician or a government employee to 
define quantitatively what Hinduism is, or 
what Christianity is. The clumsiness in the 
book in defining "Indian religionists" is due 
in large part to the decision of the authors 
not to engage the larger, reflective questions. 
Eventually, believers need to be called upon 
to explain the relationship of the essentials 
of their traditions to changes marked by 
demography.' The ecology of religious 
equilibrium and interchange cannot be 
assessed merely by numbers, and there 
needs to be the involvement of believers 
willing to discuss what the numbers mean. It 
will not work to explain changes only at a 
level where change is due to an international 
or governmental strategy. To think more 
deeply about what Christianity or Islam or 
Hinduism is' would upset the count, and 
make it difficult to state simply what exactly 
the census was counting. To fall back on an 
old phrase: the better census would have to 
be one in which believers are allowed to 
stand up and be counted. 
This leads me to my final reflection on 
how Religious Demography might be useful 
in transfonning our negotiation of the 
Hindu-Christian relationship, including 
scholarly exchange. Cenainly, the book 
provides a distinctive context for Hindu-
Christian studies. It reminds us of larger 
patterns of religious demographics that 
inevitably affect individuals interested in 
interreligious study. Involved individuals are 
members of larger communities. We need to 
keep reminding ourselves that social 
patterns affect theologies, and even census 
data can play a part in a real and well-
grounded conversation. 
Conversations across religious 
boundaries, including the scholarly Hindu-
Christian conversations exemplified in this 
journal, must be placed within a frame 
where we keep noticing the dynamics of 
change occurring around us. Just as 100 
years ago one could hardly discuss religious 
ideas comparatively without noticing the 
encompassing dynamics of colonialism, so 
too now, the demographics of each area of 
the world and the global scene itself must be 
noticed. Religions are not, and never were, 
timeless, and cannot speak merely from and 
of timeless essences. Those of us in either 
tradition, and those of us who study one or 
both, are therefore challenged to locate our 
reflection . in the context of the changing 
world scene, wherein our work is either 
helpful, Or irrelevant and missing the point 
as to where people are today, or even 
harmful, in the sense of distracting attention 
from the issues "on the ground" that matter 
to individuals and communities inside and 
outside India. 
111 the end, Religious Demography is a 
worried and somewhat gloomy book; 
surprisingly, a more theological. perspective 
might have led to a more optimistic one. 
Christians have found, even in the West, that 
the increasing presence of people of other 
religious traditions invites and even 
encoUrages learning with and from the other. 
If other traditions are clearly going to be 
present in India and not to fade away, even 
after the possibility of military and 
economic enforcement of conversions is 
ruled out, then the new demographics will 
prompt a new and in theory unending 
conversation of Hindus with more, and more 
varied, non-Hindu neighbors. Add to this the 
increasing interaction of Hindus and non-
Hindus in the West, and we can see that the 
Hindu and Christian modes of dealing with 
others may be changing in a fundamental 
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fashion, as we lose count of who belongs in 
which place. 
It would be an interesting thought 
experiment to imagine the future - let's 
say, 100 years from now, or 200 - and ask 
how it might matter for Hindu-Christian 
relations were the demographics to shift 
even more radically. If Christianity was 
about to disappear from India, how might 
Hindus react? Some might not react at all. 
Jews are not foreigners in this book, but as 
their numbers wane to almost nothing in 
India, there seems to be no outcry from 
Hindus (including the authors) about the loss 
of these venerable Indian religionists. One 
wonders whether the authors might not react 
in the same way to the disappearance of the 
old Christian communities of south India. 
Similarly, were Hindu traditions to become, 
for instance, a minority in India itself, 
should the Christian interest in interreligious 
exchange decline? I hope not. Would 
sympathetic Christians help explain, defend, 
and revitalize Hindu traditions, as if 
preserving an endangered species? I hope 
so. 
Yet all such possible or probable 
demographic changes can only count as 
factors in how religious groups make their 
decisions about how to understand and relate 
to one another; there are no merely set, 
merely static religious groups, and are no 
enduring conversations among believers 
who imagine their selves and the selves of 
others to be entirely, unchangingly settled. If 
we leam anything in dialogue, we leam to 
need one another, religiously. If so, it might 
also become a religious task to keep alive 
the diversity of the traditions that so 
characterize both India and North America: 
to keep counting, not out of fear or triumph, 
but out of joy at who we are becoming. I for 
one therefore hope for a companion volume 
from our authors, an imaginative 
(re )construction of Hindu identity that goes 
beyond the necessary groundwork of this 
valuable but incomplete volume. 
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